Volume 16
Issue 1 Winter 1986
Winter 1986

The New Federal Criminal Code: A Sampler
William W. Deaton

Recommended Citation
William W. Deaton, The New Federal Criminal Code: A Sampler, 16 N.M. L. Rev. 45 (1986).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmlr/vol16/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The University of New Mexico School of Law. For more
information, please visit the New Mexico Law Review website: www.lawschool.unm.edu/nmlr

THE NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE: A SAMPLER
WILLIAM W. DEATON*

INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984' (Crime Control Act),
enacted October 12, 1984, contains twenty-three chapters.' This article
discusses three of the twenty-three chapters: The Bail Reform Act of
1984; The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984; and The Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984. The Act made significant changes in federal criminal
law; e.g., statutory presumptions may preclude release on bail (now

"detention") hearings, 3 and the burden of proving the insanity defense
has been shifted to the defendant. 4 Changes in the three chapters discussed
in the article are illustrative of the scope of changes made in the other
*District Judge, Second Judicial District, State of New Mexico; formerly Federal Public Defender,
District of New Mexico (1976-1981), and partner in Deaton & Twohig (1981-1985).
1. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Title II; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1-5042,
18 U.S.C. appendix II 88 1201-1203, and 21 U.S.C. §8 801-970.
2. Id. See Chapter I, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156; Chapter II, The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. 88 3551-3580; Chapter III, The Comprehensive Forfeiture
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964, 21 U.S.C. §§853, 881; 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607, 1613, 1616;
Chapter IV, The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§4241-4247, and 18 U.S.C.
§20; Chapter V, The Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801970; Chapter VI, Division I, The Judicial Assistance Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. 88 3701-3797; Division
II, The Juvenile Justice Runaway Youth and Missing Children Act Amendment of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5601-5777; Chapter VII, Surplus Federal Property Amendment, 40 U.S.C. §484; Chapter VIII,
Labor Racketeering Amendments, 29 U.S.C. § 186; 29 U.S.C. § 401; 29 U.S.C. § 111; 29 U.S.C.
§504 and 29 U.S.C. § 1136; Chapter IX, Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act Amendment, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316, 5321, 5322, 5323, and 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); Chapter X, Miscellaneous
Violent Crime Amendment, 18 U.S.C. §§ 16, 1952A, 1952B, 373, 924, 1006, 929, 1201, 115,
111, 1113, 1153, 114, 31, 1365, 1114, 28 U.S.C. §1826, 18 U.S.C. §844, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1);
Chapter XI, Serious Non Violent Crime, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2232, 666 (new), 511 (new), 2113(c), 215,
1344 (new), 1791, 1792, 4012 (new), 667, 2316, 2317, 219; Chapter XII [Procedural Amendments]
18 U.S.C. H§5032, 5038, 2516, 2518, 3237(a), 3239, 1345 (new), 3731, 3521-3528, 28 U.S.C.
§576, 18 U.S.C. H 951, 7, 3505-3507, 3292, 3161; Chapter XIII, The National Narcotics Act of
1984, 21 U.S.C. §8 1201-1204, 1111; Chapter XIV, The Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 10601-10604; Chapter XV, The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1502,
2320; Chapter XVI, The Credit Card Fraud Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1029; Chapter XVII,
[Salaries of United States Attorneys], 28 U.S.C. §548; Chapter XVIII, The Armed Career Criminal
Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. app. §8 1201-1203; Chapter XIX, The Criminal Justice Act Revision of
1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A; Chapter XX, Part A, The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Hostage-Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203. Part B, The Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. §8 3132; Chapter XXI, The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. 88 1001, 1030; Chapter XXII, 29 U.S.C. §524a (Statute allowed to legislate regarding labor
racketeering); Chapter XXIII, 21 U.S.C. §§ 853, 855 (regarding penalties).
3. 18 U.S.C. §3142(e).
4. Id.§20.
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chapters of the Crime Control Act. On October 30, 1984, The Criminal
Fine Enforcement Act of 1984 also became law.5 Like the Crime Control
Act, The Criminal Fine Enforcement Act profoundly altered the preexisting federal criminal law. Hence, both acts should be closely studied
by federal criminal law practitioners.
THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
The Bail Reform Act of 19846 establishes new release procedures. The
judicial officer (magistrate) must consider whether releasing a defendant
will endanger the safety of any other person or the community. 7 The
magistrate may be required to hold a "detention hearing" where certain
crimes are involved or where there is a serious risk of flight or obstruction
of justice. 8 The Act creates a two-pronged test which considers "safety"
as well as flight risk.9
Numerous changes in bail proceedings reflect a stated congressional
concern for community safety 0 and a desire to deal more effectively with
dangerous defendants." The Senate Judiciary Committee cited studies
from a number of jurisdictions. These studies indicated that approximately
16% of those persons on release pending criminal judicial proceedings
were rearrested 2 and almost half of those rearrested were convicted of a
new crime.' 3 The Judiciary Committee found that this disturbing rate of
recidivism among releasees necessitated a new release law permitting
consideration of the danger a defendant may pose to others in addition
to the likelihood that he may not appear at trial.' 4 The studies 5 relied on
by the Committee indicated that the presence of certain combinations of
offense and offender characteristics facilitated accurate prediction of the
likelihood that a defendant would commit a new offense while on re-7
lease. 16 Accordingly, these "characteristics" were included in the statute.'
This listing of "characteristics" in the statute also reflects the committee's
5. Id. §§3621-3623.
6. Id.H83141-3156 (1984).
7. Id.§ 3142(b).
8. Id.§ 3142(f).
9. Id.§ 3142(b).
10. S.Rep.No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 5, & 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 3185-3186, 3187-3189.
11. Id.at 6-7, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3188-3190.
12. Id. at 6 n.14.
13. Id.
14. Id.at 6.
15. Institute for Law and Social Research, PretrialRelease and Misconduct in the District of
Columbia 41 (April 1980), as cited in S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3189 n. 15.
16. S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 31913192.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (1984).
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feeling that judges lack the tools to make honest and appropriate decisions
regarding the release of persons posing a danger to the safety of the
community. "
A. Release Conditions
The Bail Reform Act provides more specific guidance to the magistrate
by prescribing an increased number of suggested conditions which can
be imposed if a person is released before trial,' 9 including enunciation of
specific requirements concerning work or school, use of intoxicants, medical or psychiatric treatment, as well as a statutorily mandated condition
prohibiting the releasee from committing a crime during his release.2"
The statutory release conditions of the Bail Reform Act can make
pretrial release difficult to obtain. An arrested person is brought before a
magistrate who is obliged to enter an order either releasing or detaining
him pending judicial proceedings. 2' Pretrial release on personal recognizance or on unsecured bond must be ordered unless the magistrate
determines that further conditions2 2 should be imposed. In imposing conditions of release the magistrate must satisfy the two-pronged testassuring the person's appearance and protecting the safety of the community.23
In determining whether conditions of release will assure future appearance of the arrested person and that the release will not endanger the
safety of another or the community, the magistrate must consider the
offense, the weight of the evidence, the history and the character of the
defendant, and the nature and seriousness of any danger posed by the
defendant's release.24 On motion of the government, the magistrate must
also make inquiry into the source of any property pledged to the court
or used as collateral or for paying the premium on an appearance bond
being posted in cash or by a surety.25 Although the magistrate may not
impose any financial condition which results in the pretrial detention of
the defendant, 26 he can decline to accept designated property or collateral
which, because of its source, would not reasonably assure the appearance
of the person as required.27
18. S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 31873188.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(C) (1984).
20. Id. §3142(C)(1).
21. Id. §§3141(a) and 3142.
22. Id. §§3142(C)(1) and (2).
23. Id. §3142(b).
24. Id. § 3142(g).
25. Id. §3142(g)(4). Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1321(c) (Cum. Supp. 1985). See U.S. v.
Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (1984).
27. Id. § 3142(g)(4).
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B. Detention Hearings
The purpose of a detention hearing is to determine whether the twopronged test for release is satisfied. 28 At the hearing, the defendant has
the right to counsel, the right to testify and call witnesses, the right to
offer information by proffer, and the right to cross-examine government
witnesses.29 The rules of evidence do not apply at a detention hearing,
but the facts relied upon by the magistrate in determining that no condition
will satisfy the safety prong of the test must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.3" If certain offenses are involved, the government
may seek a detention hearing in which the magistrate must decide whether
any set of conditions will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance
and the safety of others and the community. 3 There is a limited statutory
rebuttable presumption that no set of conditions will reasonably satisfy
the safety prong of the release test.32 This rebuttable presumption arises
upon a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused committed
certain federal controlled substances offenses which carry a maximum
term of imprisonment of ten years or more33 or a finding that the defendant
has used a firearm in connection with the commission of any crime of
violence.34 The rebuttable presumption also arises where the accused has
committed certain crimes while on release within a specified prior period
of time. "

Either the government or the magistrate may move for a detention
hearing if there is (a) a serious risk that the defendant will flee or (b) a
serious risk of obstruction of justice or interference with a prospective
witness or juror." The detention hearing must be held at the first ap28. Id. § 3142(b).
29. Id. § 3142(f). Such testimony, however, might be usable at trial, particularly in cross examination. There is also a risk of waiver of the right against self-incrimination.
30. Id. §3142(f). Since FED. R. Evro. i101(d)(3) indicates that the rules of evidence do not
apply in a release hearing, special precautions may be necessary. In U.S. v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755
F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1985), the court held that statements made by the government in a detention
hearing can be taken as accurate unless the defendant asks the court to test the quality of the
government's evidence in camera.
31. 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(1) (1984).
32. Id. §3142(e).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 841 permits sentences up to 20 years for manufacture, distribution or possession
with the intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of a narcotic drug" from schedule I or schedule II other than substances obtained from coca
leaves or chemically identical to such substances. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(A)(i). The same penalty
applies to a kilogram or more of any other controlled substance in schedule I or II which is a narcotic
drug, 500 grams of phencyclidine (PCP), or 5 grams of Lysergic acid (LSD). 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(l)(A)(ii), (iii), and (iv) (1984). Sentences of up to 15 years may be imposed for possession
of schedule I and II substances not covered elsewhere; and a second offense involving less than 50
kilograms of marijuana, less than 10 kilograms of hashish, or less than one kilogram of hashish oil
can lead to imprisonment for up to 10 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(B) and (C) (1984). This list is
not exhaustive.
34. 18 U.S.C. §3142(e) (1984). See 18 U.S.C. §924(c) (1984).
35. 18 U.S.C. §3142(e)(l)-(3).
36. Id. § 3142(f)(2).
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pearance before the magistrate unless a continuance is granted.37 The
maximum length of such a continuance is prescribed, absent a showing
of good cause for a longer continuance." The defendant is detained during
the period of the continuance. 39 If a defendant appears to be a narcotics
addict, the government may obtain an order requiring a medical examination to determine whether the defendant is a narcotics addict.'
C. Temporary Detention
The code also provides for "temporary detention."'" The magistrate
shall order temporary detention if he finds at the detention hearing that
the defendant may flee or pose a danger to any other person or the
community42 and, additionally, that the defendant was (1) on release from
a pending felony trial, or (2) on release pending sentencing or appeal
from a sentence or conviction, or completion of sentence for any offense,
or (3) on probation or parole, or (4) is not a citizen or lawfully admitted
resident.43 In such cases the magistrate directs the government attorney
to notify the appropriate agency, such as the supervising probation office,
of the detention." Unless the agency acts during the temporary detention
period which cannot exceed 10 days, the defendant is treated in accordance with the other sections of the Act;45 i.e., his release is determined
after considering the offense, the weight of the evidence, and the history
and characteristics of the accused.' Temporary detention allows time for
government agencies to act with respect to certain defined persons. Although temporary detention would seem to be limited to persons presently
being accused or who have been convicted of felonies, or persons who
are not citizens or lawfully admitted residents, its practical impact may
be appreciably broader. At a temporary detention hearing, the person
being held has the burden of proving his citizenship or immigration
37. Id. §3142(f).
38. Id. A continuance granted on the motion of the person may not exceed five days. One granted
on motion of the government may not exceed three days.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. §3142(d). D.C. CODE ANN. §§23-1322(e) (1985) is the progenitor of the temporary
detention provision of the new federal code. The federal law allows detention for up to 10 days
(D.C. allowed 5 days plus Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays like § 3142(d)). Although U.S. v.
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (App. DC 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982), inter alia, upholds
the constitutionality of portions of § 23-1322, it does not touch on § 23-1322(e).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (1984).
43. Id. § 3142(d)(1). The federal code added provisions concerning non-citizens which are not
in the D.C. code section cited above. The net result is that a non-citizen who is not lawfully admitted
for permanent residence who is charged with a federal crime is likely to be temporarily detained for
10 days unless he can convince the judicial officer that he poses no flight risk. Even if he is successful
in this, the government can have such a charged non-citizen held if it can convince the judicial
officer that the person is a danger to another or to the community.
44. Id. § 3142(d).
45. Id.
46. Id. §3142(g).
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status.4 7 Persons unable to prove their citizenship or residency status
readily may be temporarily detained when otherwise they would have
been released on some set of conditions.
In The Bail Reform Act of 1984, Congress articulated specific considerations to be followed by judicial officers who are setting bail for criminal
defendants. 48 Defendants apparently involved in the more serious drug
and firearm offenses now have to clear the hurdle of a "rebuttable presumption" before they can be released.49 Other provisions of the Acttemporary detention," a statutory Nebbia-type hearing which considers
the source of bond money or collateral, 5 forced examination of persons
appearing to be narcotics addicts 52-undoubtedly will make release more
difficult for some individuals. On the other hand, magistrates may no
longer impose unnecessarily stringent financial conditions for release.53
Also, the Act's focus on reduction of crimes committed by releasees may
help achieve the community safety objective of the legislation. The changes
in the Act are significant. Despite this, most persons who would have
been released under the old Act probably will be released under the new
Act.
THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
The four announced purposes for imposing sentences in criminal cases
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(2),5 4 as factors to be considered in
imposing a sentence and summarized by the Judiciary Committee as
"deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation, ' 55 are
central to the philosophy underlying the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
Congress has articulated broad goals in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.56 Sentencing should be consistent, fair, and certain; and the sentencing judge should have a full range of sentencing options available to
him. 57 The Senate Judiciary Committee found that the old law met none
of these goals.58 In attempting to attain the goals, Congress created a
sentencing commission which will promulgate a sentencing guideline
47. Id.
48. Id. § 3142(g).
49. Id. § 3142(e).
50. Id. §3142(d).
51. Id. § 3142(g)(4). See U.S. v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), which permitted inquiry
into the source of bail money.
52. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
53. Id. §3142(c).
54. S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 75-76, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
3258-3259.
55. Id. at 67, supra note 10 at 75-76 reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3250.
56. Id. at 39, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3222.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 39-50, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3222-3233.
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system, 9 prospectively abolished the United States Parole Commission,'
instituted a type of determinate sentencing with statutory vested good
time, 6' and provided for the development of pre-release programs for
incarcerated persons.62
Sentencing guidelines are to be promulgated within 18 months of the
Act63 by the newly created United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission).6 A detailed analysis of the legislation creating the
Sentencing Commission6 5 is beyond the scope of this article.' In general,
however, the Sentencing Commission is charged67 with implementing the
four purposes of sentencing." The Sentencing Commission is required
to "assume that the guidelines will specify a sentence to a substantial
term of imprisonment" for certain categories of defendants, including
those with prior convictions' and to favor the imposition of an "incremental penalty" where multiple offenses are involved.7 ° Non-custodial
sanctions are suggested for non-violent first offenders in appropriate cases. 7
Although sentencing guidelines are still in the incubation period, their
impact on future sentencings is foreseeable. The sentencing court will be
59. Id. at 51, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3234.
60. Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, §§ 218(a)(5), 235 (1984).
61. S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3239.
62. Id. at 57, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3240.
63. Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 235(a)(l)(B)(i).
64. 28 U.S.C. §§991-998 (1984). The United States Sentencing Commission, appointed by the
President will be an independent commission within the judicial branch and will consist of 7 voting
members and I non-voting member (the Attorney General or his designee). At least 3 of the members
will be federal judges. As set out in 28 U.S.C. §991(b), the purposes of the Commission are as
follows:
(1) [To] establish sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice
system that(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in § 3553(a)(2)
of Title 18, United States Code;
(B) provides certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while
maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in
the establishment of general sentencing practices; and
(C) reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human
behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process; and
(2) [To] develop means of measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal,
and correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing
as set forth in § 3553(a)(2) of Title 18, United States Code.
65. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1984).
66. See id. § 994 (Duties) and id. U.S.C. § 995 (Powers) for an understanding of the scope and
nature of the Sentencing Commission as well as the detailed congressional direction given the
Commission by Congress.
67. Id. § 991 (b)(l)(A); id. § 991 (b)(2); id. § 994(a)(2); and id. § 994(g)(m).
68. See supra notes 13, 14, 15, 18 and accompanying text.
69. 28 U.S.C. §994(i) (1984).
70. Id. § 994(1).
71. Id. § 9940) and (k).
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obliged to impose a sentence within the range established by the sentencing commission guidelines "unless the court finds that an aggravating
or mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration" in formulating the guidelines "and that should result in a
sentence different from that described [in the guidelines]." 72 Each factor
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)--"deterrence, incapacitation, just punish73
ment and rehabilitation"-must be considered in imposing sentence;
although, in a particular case one purpose may predominate." 4 The sentencing court is required to make a statement as to the reasons for imposing
a particular sentence, and if the sentence imposed is outside of the guidelines, the court is required to state the specific reason for the deviation. 75
If the sentence imposed is greater than that proposed by the guidelines,
the defendant can appeal. If it is less, the government can appeal.76
Appellate review of the sentencing court's application of the guidelines
is likely to be common. The court of appeals may set aside the sentence
or impose either a greater or lesser sentence or remand to the district
court.

77

It is unlikely that sentencing guidelines will be completed by April of
1986, eighteen months after the law was enacted .7' The President can be
expected to appoint to the Sentencing Commission persons who share
his political philosophies regarding the treatment of criminals at that time.
It will be interesting to see what emerges in the way of guidelines from
the Sentencing Commission to be appointed by President Reagan. Hopefully there will be more consistency, fairness and certainty in sentencing.
Once sentencing guidelines are in effect, they will be distributed to all
courts of the United States and to the United States probation system.79
Counsel should use them to effectively represent a client at sentencing. 0
THE INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM ACT OF 1984
Prior to the enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, the so-called "insanity defense" was not uniform throughout the
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1984); See S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 51-52, reprinted in 1984
& AD. NEWS, 3234-3235.
73. S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 67, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3250.
74. Id. at 68 reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3251.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).
76. Id. § 3742.
77. Id. § 3742(e).
78. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, THE CRIME CONTROL AND FINE ENFORCEMENT ACTS OF 1984: A SYNOPSIs
(1985).
79. 28 U.S.C. §994 (1984).
80. See id. § 994(a)(2). Failure of counsel to use the guidelines could well result in a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
U.S. CODE CONG.
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federal system. 8 In all federal courts, however, the prosecutor had the
burden of proving the nonexistence of legal insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt once the defendant produced substantial evidence of legal insanity.
The same burden of proof was required in the proposed code drafted by
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws in 197 1.2
Under the pre-1984 Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal
courts uniformly allowed a psychiatrist testifying on the issue of insanity
to give his opinion as to the ultimate issue, i.e., whether the accused was
legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.8 3
Historically, insanity defenses have been infrequent in federal criminal
cases.' 4 For a number of years there has been some dissatisfaction with
the defense. In 1984, Congress made sweeping changes in the federal
insanity defense.85 The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 reverses
the burden of proof of the insanity defense. A defendant raising the
insanity defense must prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence.86 At trial, the expert used by either side cannot testify as to the
ultimate issue of the defendant's sanity at the time the alleged crime was
committed .87 These dramatic changes in the insanity defense were preceded by much congressional consideration and one dramatic historical
81. In 1971, in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the insanity defense was
available to a person if at the time of his criminal conduct he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The District
of Columbia Circuit was still operating under the "product" of mental disease or defect approach
set out in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) further refined by McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Third Circuit emphasized the accused
"capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law violated" as set out in United States
v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1961). Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws: Hearingson Report
of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., I st Sess.,
194 (1971) (Comment following § 503, Mental Disease or Defect, of the proposed code submitted
by the National Commission).
82. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on Report of the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,supra note 81 at 195.
83. S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 230-231, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
3412-3413.
84. In the summer of 1982, Senator Robert Dole stated:
Although statistics show that the insanity defense is rarely invoked in criminal
prosecutions, the violent nature of the acts it is usually associated with demands
that its use be governed by the most stringent rules that we can devise which are
consistent with enlightened principles of accountability under the law.
Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S.818, S.1106, S.1558, S.1995, S.2572, S.2658, &
S.2669 Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 84 (1982) (opening statement of Honorable Robert Dole, a U.S. Senator from the
State of Kansas).
85. See supra notes 78-81.
86. 18 U.S.C. §20(b) (1984).
87. Comprehensive Crime Control Act § 406 (pp. 231-32, 98 Stat. 2067-68); Amendment to
FED. R. EviD. 704.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

event. In this instance, clearly "a page of history is worth a volume of
logic." 8 The historical "page" can be summarized in two words: John
Hinckley.89
A. Background
On June 21, 1982, John Hinckley was found not guilty of the attempted
assassination of the President by reason of insanity.' John Hinckley's
legacy to deranged federal defendants can be fully appreciated only against
the background of pre-Hinckley legislative proposals regarding the insanity defense.
In 1971, the National Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal
Laws (National Commission) proposed a test for legal insanity which
closely followed the test set forth by the American Law Institute (ALI)
in its Model Penal Code. 9 This test states that "[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result
of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law." 92 The ALl Model Penal Code also addressed procedural problems
requiring that the insanity defense be raised by the defendant on notice
to the prosecution, as well as certain other procedural requirements. The
record in later Senate hearings indicated that the ALl standard for the
insanity defense as well as the procedure for raising the defense had been
generally well received.9 3 Neither the ALl Model Penal Code nor the
National Commission proposal made insanity an affirmative defense.'
88. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
89. Senators Hatch, Thurman, Zorinsky, Pressler, Maddingly, and Dole each referred to the
Hinckley verdict of June 21, 1982, and called for revision and reform of the federal insanity rule.
128 CONG. REc. S7241 (daily ed. June 22, 1982); CONG. REc. S7241 (daily ed. June 22, 1982)
(statements of Senators Hatch, Thurman, Zorinsky, Pressler, Maddingly, and Dole).
90. Id.
91. Congress established the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law in 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-801. The American Law Institute, created in 1923, is dedicated to improvement of
the law. Proceedings, The American Law Institute, Vol. 1 (1923). The ALl has published a number
of Restatements of the Law. On May 24, 1962, the ALl approved the Model Penal Code. Article
4 of the Model Penal Code deals with the ALl proposed insanity defense.
92. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings on Report of the National Commission on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 81, at 10. Ex-govemor Edmund G. Brown of
California, chairman of the Commission, commented generally that the proposed revision "codifies
common defenses which presently are left to conflicting common law decisions by the Court"; id.
at 91, Congressman Richard H. Poff, vice chairman of the Commission, made a similar general
reference to §503. Id. at 103.
93. Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Proceduresof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,PartH, State Experience, 92nd Cong.,
1st Sess., 542-543 (1971) Wechsler, Codification of CriminalLaw in the United States: The Model
Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1425, 1443-1444 (1968).
94. With the defenses which were made affirmative defenses, the burden of proof was by a
preponderance of the evidence. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearingson Report of the
National Commission on Reform of Federal CriminalLaws Before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Laws and Proceduresof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 81. at 157-158.
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In 1973, in the first attempted overall revision of the federal criminal
code (Senate Bill 1 or S. 1) following the work of the National Commission, the standard for mental illness was substantially identical to that set
forth by the National Commission in their proposed reform. 95 President
Nixon, on the other hand, suggested that the insanity defense should be
effective "only if the defendant did not know what he was doing. "' The
Nixon sponsored bill, which set out the so-called "intent test," stated
that "[i]t is a defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that the
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the state of
mind required as an element of the offense charged. Mental disease or
97 Extensive Senate hearings98
defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. ,,
produced no new code.
Several commentators proposed abolishing the insanity defense. 99 Directly and indirectly, the Department of Justice continued to advocate
adoption of the provisions sought by President Nixon,"' and represen95. Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,93rd Cong., Ist Sess., 4242, 4763-4764
(1973).
96. Id. at 4837. Attorney General John Mitchell also referred to the "criminal intent" test urged
by Nixon. Id. at 4842.
97. Id. at 4889.
98. Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws
and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Part 1, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., (1971);
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and
Proceduresof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Part II, 92nd Cong., IstSess. (1971); Reform
of the FederalCriminal Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Procedures
92nd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1972); Reform of the
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part111,
Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,PartV,93rd Cong., IstSess. (1973); Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary,Part VI, 93rd Cong., IstSess. (1973); Reform of the FederalCriminal
Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Proceduresof the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, Part VIII, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Reform of the FederalCriminal Laws:
HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary,PartIX, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1973); Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Part X, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. (1974); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,PartXI,
94th Cong., IstSess. (1974); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, PartXII, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on CriminalLaws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,PartXII, 95th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1977); Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws: HearingsBefore the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary,PartXIV,96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws: Hearings
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Part XV, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Reform of
the FederalCriminal Laws: HearingsBefore the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,PartXVI, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
99. See Monahan, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719 (1973);
Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the Insanity Defense?-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963); Brady,
Abolish the Insanity Defense-No!, 8 HouST. L. REv. 629 (1971).
100. Reform of the FederalCriminalLaws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws
and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Part IX, supra, note 98 at 6479-6488
(statement of Richard A. Givens, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, New York, New York); Reform
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tatives of professional psychiatric associations protested that those provisions were retrogressive.'°'
In 1977 and in 1979, new criminal codes were considered but not
passed by Congress. The proposed definition of legal insanity as a criminal
defense seemed to vary with the party in power.' °2 By late 1981, Senate
hearings on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws had compiled a written
record of well over 12,000 pages. No comprehensive revision of the
federal criminal code, however, had been enacted. More specifically, no
federal law regarding the insanity defense had been enacted.
B. The Hinckley Verdict
On June 21, 1982, after a jury trial, John Hinckley was found not
guilty of attempting to assassinate President Ronald Reagan by reason of
being legally insane at the time of the offense. The next day Senator Orin
Hatch called for enactment of major reforms in the federal insanity defense.' 03 Senator Hatch sought to limit the insanity defense to the intent
test, i.e., a determination of whether the defendant possessed the requisite
state of mind for the charged offense. "04 The acquittal of John Hinckley
brought the insanity defense into sharp focus and resulted in an almost
immediate Senate reaction. 5 After years of considering various proposals, Congress had the impetus to act.
of the FederalCriminalLaws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Procedures
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Part X, supra, note 98 at 6805-6807 (statement of Ronald
L. Gainer, Department of Justice); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Part X,
supra, note 98 at 6808-6822 (statement of Prof. David Robinson, consultant to the Department of
Justice).
101. Reform of the Federal CriminalLaws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws
and Procedures of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,Part X, supra, note 98 at 7004-7017
(statement of Dr. Stanley L. Portnow, M.D., Chairman, Committee on Psychiatry and the Law,
American Psychiatric Association); Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Part X,
supra, note 98 at 7023-7042 (statement of Seymour Pollack, M.D., President, American Academy
of Psychiatry and the Law).
102. In 1973, § 502 of S. 1400, the Nixon administration bill defined insanity as lacking the
requisite state of mind for the offense charged. Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Part V, supra, note 98 at 4889. In 1975, in S. 1, the same approach was used. Reform of the Federal
Criminal Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Procedures of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Part XII, supra, note 98 at 218-219. Later, in 1977, insanity was
defined in S.1437 as "a mental disease or defect of a nature constituting a defense to a federal
criminal prosecution." 9733. In 1979, in S.1723, the insanity defense proposed was very close to
the ALl version proposed in 1971 by the National Commission. Reform of the Federal Criminal
Laws: HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on CriminalLaws and Proceduresof the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary,PartXV, supra, note 98 at 11,499. In 1981, in S. 1636, the Reagan administration
bill, insanity was defined as "mental disease or defect as a result of which a person lacked the state
of mind required as an element of the offense charged." Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws:
HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, PartXVI, supra, note 98 at 12,726.
103. 128 CONG. REc. S7241 (daily ed. June 22, 1982) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 7241-43.
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Three days after the Hinckley verdict, the Senate Judiciary Committee
commenced hearings for the purpose of limiting the insanity defense."o
The Judiciary Committee acknowledged that the hearings had been called
because "of the public concern engendered by the acquittal of Mr. Hinck°
ley.'" 7 The Senate was extremely agitated by the Hinckley verdict.'
Five of the Hinckley jurors appeared before a Senate committee, and the
testimony of Hinckley's trial judge was unsuccessfully sought."9 Certain
witnesses argued for retaining the insanity defense as it was in the federal
system. Other views predominated. "o
Eight bills addressing the federal insanity defense were introduced at
the outset of the hearings. "' Obviously, the Hinckley acquittal had been
anticipated by certain senators. Several of the proposed bills put the
2
insanity defense burden of proof on the defendant. None of the proposed
bills, however, imposed any burden of proof higher than a preponderance
of the evidence. 1"3
Senate Report 98-225 is helpful in its succinct explanation of the revised
insanity defense contained in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984. ,,"
In summary, the definition of insanity is substantially narrowed. The
defendant has the burden of proving the insanity defense by clear and
convincing evidence. Expert testimony on the ultimate legal issue of
106. Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary,United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982) at 1.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 34-36, 82.
109. Id. at 1-2, 155-169, 219-220.
110. Twenty individuals, including several senators, the Attorney General of the United States,
judges, professors, and attorneys on both sides, testified at the hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in the summer of 1982. Id. at 11l. Attorney Frank Maloney, id., at 115-155, spoke on
behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Richard J. Bonnie, id., at
267-282, Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Law, Psychiatric and Public Policy, University
of Virginia, sought to retain the insanity defense as it was in the federal system. Most of the testimony
was opposed to this view.
11l. Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the
Committee on the Judiciary,United States Senate, note 106 supra at 1; The InsanityDefense: Hearings
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (Bills to Amend Title 18 to Limit the
Insanity Defense), note 12 infra at 527 (S.2672), 534 (S.2678), and 547 (S.2780). These bills were
S.818, S.1106, S.1558, S.2669, S.2672, S.2678, S.2745, and S.2780. They all addressed the
insanity defense in terms of a mental disease or defect resulting in the defendant lacking the state
of mind required as an element of the offense charged. Senate Bill 2678 provided a defense to
criminal prosecution if the defendant "as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked (1) the ability
to understand the nature and quality of the act, or (2) the ability to distinguish right and wrong in
respect to the act. Mental condition was not a defense to any charge of criminal conduct under
S.2745. Senate Bill 2745 also contained a provision for confining people who have been found not
guilty but who were insane. The possibility for abuse of such a law seems obvious. The provisions
of S.2780 regarding the insanity defense were similar to the provisions contained in S.2678.
112. The Insanity Defense: HearingsBefore the Committee on the Judiciary,United States Senate
(Bills to Amend Title 18 to Limit the Insanity Defense), 97th Cong., 2nd Sess., at 527 (S.2672),
534 (S.2678), and 547 (S.2780) (1982).
113. Id. at 527 (S.2672) & 547 (S.2780).
114. S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10 at 222-254, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS,
3404-3436.
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whether the defendant was insane is prohibited. "5 The new law may
represent a victory for the Department of Justice." 6 For the deranged
accused and his defense counsel, the message is much grimmer.
CONCLUSION

Changes made in other portions of the Federal Criminal Code are at
least as dramatic as the changes mentioned above. The Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 is a benchmark in changing governmental
attitudes and responses toward persons accused and convicted of federal
crimes. The message seems clear: Congress has a much tougher attitude
toward persons who violate federal criminal statutes, and Congress is
articulating this attitude in more specific directions to the federal courts.

115. See supra notes 78-81.
116. See S.Rep.No. 225, supra note 10, at 222-223, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 3404-3405.

